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of a more active international judiciary. 1 As litigants ask courts to adjudicate an expanding and diverse array of controversies, judges must inevitably clarify the meaning of ambiguous treaty provisions and customary rules, and apply them to new and unforeseen contexts. Yet the rising number of IC rulings bears no necessary relationship to whether those rulings infl uence state behavior. Nor does it answer the more fundamental question of "eff ective for what purpose?"-an inquiry that depends on a prior conception of the functions that ICs perform and the goals they are expected to achieve. 2 Traditionally, the principal function of ICs was to provide a judicial forum to assist nation states in settling their disputes. As the number and variety of ICs has increased, however, international judges have been given or have assumed a broad range of other tasks. Th ese include exercising constitutional, enforcement, and administrative review; 3 stabilizing normative expectations and legitimating the exercise of public authority; 4 improving state compliance with primary legal norms; 5 engaging in judicial lawmaking to clarify or expand substantive obligations; 6 and enhancing the legitimacy of international norms and institutions, including of ICs themselves. 7 Recent scholarship on IC eff ectiveness analyzes these functions from a range of vantage points. Some studies focus on developing typologies to categorize the multiple roles that ICs perform. Others assess empirically whether a particular IC, or the international judicial system in general, is successful in achieving one or more identifi ed objectives. Yet another group of studies makes normative claims about which goals international judges ought to prioritize, regardless of the tasks that they in fact perform.
Th e literature exploring these issues includes works by legal scholars, political scientists, and interdisciplinary research teams. It would be impossible in this short chapter to do justice to this burgeoning literature. 8 Th e chapter focuses instead on four dimensions of IC eff ectiveness that, in this author's view, are important either because they have engendered debates among scholars, or, conversely, because they relate to core IC functions but have received insuffi cient scrutiny. Th e fi rst dimension, case-specifi c eff ectiveness (Section 2), evaluates whether the litigants to a specifi c dispute follow the orders and provide the remedies that a court awards-an issue closely linked to compliance with IC judgments.
9 Th e second variant, erga omnes eff ectiveness (Section 3), assesses whether IC rulings have systemic precedential eff ects that infl uence the behavior of all states subject to a tribunal's jurisdiction. Th e third dimension, embeddedness eff ectiveness (Section 4), evaluates the extent to which ICs anchor their judgments in domestic legal orders, enabling national actors to remedy potential treaty violations at home and avoid the need for international litigation. Th e fourth type, eff ectiveness in developing international law or norm-development eff ectiveness (Section 5), considers how IC decisions contribute to building a body of international jurisprudence-a topic relevant to the decentralized nature of the international legal system and debates over the fragmentation of international law. A brief conclusion (Section 6) follows.
For each dimension of IC eff ectiveness, the chapter reviews recent studies, identifi es contested or under-analyzed issues and suggests avenues for future research. It does not, however, defend the substantive merits of the four eff ectiveness measures, nor does it evaluate their consequences for other values or objectives. For example, an IC that is adroit at developing international legal norms or embedding its judgments in domestic law may, as a result, narrow the discretion of government policymakers or diminish state sovereignty. Whether these or other consequences of IC eff ectiveness are normatively desirable or problematic is beyond the scope of this chapter.
Case-Specific Effectiveness
Among the four dimensions of eff ectiveness, scholars have focused most heavily on whether the parties to a particular dispute obey an IC's judgment. Th is section reviews the theoretical literature on case-specifi c eff ectiveness and analyzes debates among scholars over its relationship to the distinct concept of state compliance with IC rulings. Th e section concludes by suggesting how future studies might help to resolve these debates and gain greater traction on the causal impact of IC rulings.
Early studies of case-specifi c eff ectiveness focused on whether a state found in breach of international law changed its behavior following an IC judgment. Laurence Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter, for example, defi ned eff ectiveness in terms of an IC's "ability to compel compliance with its judgments by convincing domestic government institutions, directly and through pressure from private litigants, to use their power on its behalf. "
10 Th is defi nition recognized that most ICs cannot count on international enforcement mechanisms and must instead build support from domestic actors who in turn induce governments to respect IC rulings. Th e defi nition also expressly equated the concepts of case-specifi c eff ectiveness and compliance.
Subsequent theoretical contributions, however, emphasized the distinction between compliance and eff ectiveness. In an infl uential article, Kal Raustiala defi ned compliance as conformity between behavior and a specifi ed legal rule, and eff ectiveness as "observable, desired changes in behavior" attributable to that rule. 11 In applying these defi nitions, Raustiala disaggregated the two concepts. High levels of compliance can occur "for reasons entirely exogenous to the legal process, " such as where states draft treaties to mirror their preexisting behavior.
12 Conversely, international rules "can be eff ective even if compliance with them is low. If a legal standard is quite demanding, even widespread failure to meet it may still correlate with observable, desired changes in behavior. "
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Th e basic insight is that international rules with high compliance rates may be entirely ineff ective, whereas those with low compliance rates may be quite eff ective if they engender some modifi cation of state behavior. Th e dangers of confl ating the two concepts have led some scholars boldly to assert that compliance is "unusually ill-suited to [a] central social-scientifi c pursuit: the identifi cation and measurement of causal eff ects, " and to argue in favor of "dropping compliance as a central concept in the study of institutional eff ects. "
14
Scholars of ICs also stress the need to disentangle compliance and eff ectiveness. Karen Alter argues that "the real eff ectiveness test . . . is not compliance but the counterfactual of what the outcome would have been absent the IC. Th ose concerned with eff ectiveness should ask whether the IC contributed to moving a state in a more law-complying direction. " 15 Alexandra Huneeus expands upon this insight. She recognizes the risks of confl ating compliance and eff ectiveness, but asserts that those risks are "arguably less acute" for compliance with court orders than for compliance with treaty commitments more generally. If an IC "orders compensation of the victim by a certain amount, and the state compensates by that amount, drawing a causal inference is not particularly fraught. Th e answer to the counterfactual-would the state have done the same without the order-seems self-evident. "
19
What accounts for this sharp division in the literature? One possible explanation is diff erent scholars are analyzing distinct phenomena. Studies that equate compliance and eff ectiveness focus on whether states that litigate and lose a case carry out the IC judgments against them, whereas studies that disaggregate the two concepts measure an IC's ability to encourage compliance with underlying legal obligations.
20
Scholars in the fi rst group implicitly assume that IC rulings impose meaningful 17 Guzman, note 5, at 187. 61 . 20 Guzman, note 5, at 188. See also Shany, note 2, at 227, 244 (labeling these concepts, respectively, as "judgment-compliance" and "primary norm compliance").
constraints on state sovereignty and freedom of action-and thus can be eff ective even if compliance is slow, partial, or incomplete. 21 Scholars in the second group suspect that many IC rulings mirror preexisting state behavior-and thus lead to high levels of compliance but low levels of eff ectiveness.
22
As abstract propositions, both views are equally plausible-and equally nonfalsifi able. Future studies should expose the assumptions underlying the two approaches and test them empirically. Th e claim that IC judgments mirror the outcomes that states would have obtained through negotiation or politics may be a reasonable assumption in some issue areas or contexts, but not in others. 23 An example of the fi rst category are cases in which two nations submit a dispute over a territorial or maritime boundary to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) on an ad hoc basis. Th e tribunals' jurisprudence in such cases tends toward compromise and acknowledges the merits of both parties' claims. 24 An illustration of the second category are human rights complaints fi led by private litigants. Such suits oft en target domestic laws and practices that refl ect deeply held national values. IC judgments challenging those values are sometimes met with skepticism or overt resistance.
25
More careful attention to counterfactuals will also narrow the gap between the two approaches and assist in making plausible causal inferences about case-specifi c eff ectiveness. Recall Hawkins and Jacoby's assertion, quoted above, that when a state changes its behavior following a judgment against that state, it is reasonable to assume that the judgment materially infl uenced the behavioral change "even if other factors may also have been important. " 26 Identifying the causal contribution of those "other factors" is critical to evaluating the case-specifi c eff ectiveness of ICs.
Consider the March 2011 provisional measures issued by the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACtHPR) during the civil war in Libya. Th e court ordered the state, then headed by Muammar Gaddafi , to "immediately refrain from any action that would result in loss of life or violation of physical integrity of persons. " 27 21 Hawkins and Jacoby, note 18, at 83-5. 22 Guzman, note 5, at 187. Th e violence markedly diminished a few weeks later, but only aft er the UN Security Council authorized NATO to use military force to protect civilians. An acontextual analysis of state behavior in this instance might erroneously attribute compliance to the court's ruling, rather than to the humanitarian intervention by NATO.
Other, less obvious examples cast doubt on the presumption that compliance in the wake of an adverse ruling is indicative of eff ectiveness. Newly elected democratic governments sometimes implement IC judgments against their predecessors as a signal to foreign and domestic audiences of their commitment to abjuring the repressive policies of the past. 28 In established democracies, IC litigation may be only one component of a multifaceted civil society campaign that includes domestic mobilization, national court challenges, and transnational naming and shaming strategies. 29 In these and similar situations, it is plausible to attribute compliance, at least in part, to broader political or geostrategic factors rather than to an IC ruling.
A fi nal consideration relates to time horizons. 30 All other things being equal, a court whose decisions are implemented quickly is more eff ective than one whose judgments are complied with aft er delays. Th is assumption is appropriate as a preliminary baseline, but it must be adjusted to account for a range of other factors. It would be reasonable, for example, to expect compliance with broad or costly remedies to require more time than compliance with more modest judicial orders. 31 Th e compliance delays associated with a "high-aiming court, " to paraphrase Yuval Shany, should be discounted when evaluating that court's case-specifi c eff ectiveness. Conversely, even immediate adherence should be given little or no weight in assessing case-specifi c eff ectiveness if, as in the Libya example above, circumstances indicate that the court's decision had little to do with the change in state behavior.
Erga Omnes Effectiveness
Th e numerous studies of case-specifi c eff ectiveness refl ect a basic feature of international adjudication: IC judgments are legally binding only inter partes and do not bind other states or the court in future cases. 32 have-or at least purport to have-erga omnes eff ects that extend to all treaty parties. 33 Th is section fi rst compares the inter partes rule to the erga omnes eff ect. It then reviews the literature that examines whether IC decisions are eff ective in infl uencing the behavior of actors beyond the litigants to a particular dispute.
Th e limited binding eff ect of IC rulings is an artifact of sovereignty. By recognizing an IC's compulsory jurisdiction, a state undertakes a legal obligation to comply with judgments against it. Th e state does not, however, consent to be bound by rulings in which it did not participate, nor does it waive the right to argue that a new case should be distinguished from similar suits involving other nations. 34 Th is limitation on international judicial authority sometimes results in repetitive litigation in which the only material diff erence is the identity of the countries involved in the proceedings. Th e trilogy of ICJ cases against the United States for violating the consular rights of foreign criminal defendants is one prominent example. 35 If the inter partes rule were rigidly followed, international adjudication would be highly ineffi cient. In practice, however, ICs view their prior decisions as persuasive, especially when they have coalesced into a jurisprudence constant . Th e weight given to precedent means that "absent cogent reasons, an adjudicative body will resolve the same legal question in the same way in a subsequent case. " 36 Th e politically contested and empirically unsettled nature of the erga omnes eff ect is refl ected in the wide range of studies that consider whether ICs are eff ective in infl uencing the behavior of all actors subject to their authority. 44 One strand of scholarship has an overtly normative bent. Works in this vein seek to clarify the divergent meanings of erga omnes in judicial decisions and legal discourse, assess the desirability of strong or weak versions of the eff ect and suggest proposals to enhance the systemic impact of IC rulings. Two recent noteworthy examples are Samantha Besson's study of the ECtHR and Karin Oellers-Frahm's analysis of ICJ advisory opinions.
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A related literature considers whether states should redesign ICs to bolster the erga omnes eff ect. Attention has focused primarily on the ECtHR, due to its massive backlog of pending applications. Th e court's docket crisis has generated political declarations, such as the 2010 Interlaken Action Plan, which urges governments to consider "the conclusions to be drawn from a judgment fi nding a violation of the [European] Convention by another State, where the same problem of principle exists within their own legal system. "
46 Th e crisis has also engendered arguments from scholars and judges that the ECtHR should focus on novel legal issues and articulate general principles applicable to all states parties. 47 a more permissive approach to third-party interventions and amicus briefs oft en refl ect similar concerns.
48 Th e more that IC decisions depart from the inter partes rule, the greater the need for all potentially aff ected actors to have a meaningful opportunity to infl uence those decisions.
A third cluster of research uses quantitative empirical methods to analyze the behavior of governments, both as policymakers and as prospective litigants. A recent paper by Helfer and Erik Voeten considers the fi rst issue. It fi nds that ECtHR judgments on LGBT rights increase the likelihood that other countries in Europe-in particular states in which public acceptance of homosexuality is low-will adopt pro-LGBT policies. To measure the erga omnes eff ect, the authors code national LGBT policies by country and year adopted, control for confounding variables that could explain policy reforms and isolate the extent to which ECtHR judges respond to preexisting legal and social trends. 49 Quantitative analyses of dispute settlement patterns in the WTO analyze the behavior of states as litigants. 50 Th ese studies, including articles by Guzman and Beth Simmons, as well as by Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt, do not address the erga omnes eff ect directly. Th ey do, however, implicitly assume that prior panel and Appellate Body decisions cast a shadow that infl uences whether other nations litigate or settle a dispute over alleged violations of free trade rules.
Future research on erga omnes eff ectiveness should focus on identifying the specifi c conditions under which IC decisions are more or less likely to infl uence the behavior of non-parties. For example, qualitative process tracing and case studies can document variations in behavior among diff erent branches of government in countries subject to an IC's jurisdiction. Quantitative studies can compare the strength of the erga omnes eff ect across tribunals and issue areas. Both types of studies face similar challenges: determining whether behavioral changes are attributable to IC rulings as opposed to other factors, and identifying the specifi c mechanisms of IC infl uence. As discussed in the previous section, developing credible counterfactuals and considering plausible alternative explanations for rule-consistent conduct will be critical to overcoming these challenges. 
Embeddedness Effectiveness
A third dimension of eff ectiveness considers whether ICs enhance the ability of domestic actors to prevent or remedy violations of international rules "at home, " thus avoiding the need for international litigation. Th is section reviews studies that evaluate whether ICs are eff ective in embedding international law and international judicial rulings in national legal orders.
Embeddedness eff ectiveness received little attention when the primary task of ICs was to settle interstate disputes. Th e issue became far more salient when ICs were given authority to review challenges to domestic laws and policies in response to complaints fi led by private actors. Yet ICs have neither the competence nor the resources to review all such challenges. Th is raises the critical question of whether national judges, legislators, and administrators can be incentivized to serve as the fi rst-line defenders of international law, adopting measures that promote rule compliance and provide remedies for any violations that do occur.
Studies of whether ICs are eff ective in inducing domestic actors to carry out these functions focus on institutional design features, most notably jurisdiction and access rules. For example, tribunals that require complainants to exhaust domestic remedies must inevitably assess whether national judicial and administrative procedures off er viable opportunities for litigants to obtain redress for colorable violations of international law. Scholarship on regional human rights courts-such as Helfer's study of the ECtHR, 51 and analyses of the IACtHR by James Cavallaro and Stephanie Brewer, and by Huneeus 52 -identify how these courts construct their interpretative methods and remedial orders to incentivize compliance by national decision-makers. Prominent among these strategies is giving greater deference to decision-makers who treat IC decisions as persuasive when reviewing complaints alleging violations of individual rights.
Diff erent embeddedness issues emerge when international judges can forge direct links to their national counterparts. Scholars have widely attributed the success of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in promoting regional integration to the court's preliminary reference procedure, which enables domestic judges to seek guidance on the meaning of European Union law. 53 primary interlocutors and compliance partners. Over time, judges referred a growing number of cases and became habituated to following the ECJ's rulings. 54 When EC rules and the supranational cases interpreting them had been fi rmly entrenched in national judicial mindsets, the ECJ announced the doctrine of acte clair , which directed national judges to refrain from referring cases that raised settled legal issues, including cases in which courts were expected to-and did-invalidate the off ending domestic law or policy. 55 Preliminary reference mechanisms also enable ICs to forge alliances with domestic actors other than courts. Alter and Helfer's work on the Andean legal system demonstrates that more than 90 percent of Andean Tribunal of Justice (ATJ) rulings emanate from administrative agencies that apply Andean intellectual property rules when reviewing applications to register trademarks and patents. A litigant dissatisfi ed with an agency's decision can appeal to national courts, which refer questions of Andean law to the ATJ and then apply the tribunal's legal interpretation to resolve the case. In practice, however, national judges have been mostly passive intermediaries in a mutually constitutive relationship between Andean judges and domestic administrators. Th e agencies encouraged references and participated in litigation before the tribunal, and the ATJ issued decisions that responded to the agencies' concerns. ATJ rulings improved the agencies' decision-making procedures, clarifi ed ambiguities in Andean rules, helped to insulate offi cials from political pressure and bolstered administrators' fi delity to the rule of law. Th e agencies, in turn, acted as compliance constituencies for Andean judges, scrupulously following Andean law as interpreted by the ATJ even in the face of confl icting national decrees.
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Other studies have analyzed embeddedness issues in international criminal law. Th e founders of the International Criminal Court (ICC) recognized that domestic trials of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity would sometimes be preferable to international prosecutions. Th ey thus directed the ICC to declare inadmissible, inter alia, cases being investigated or prosecuted domestically, "unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution. " 57 Th is complementarity principle requires the ICC to make fi ne-grained evaluations of the intent and capacity of government offi cials in international proceedings. Unfortunately, the ICC's emphasis on atrocities in Africa has stirred controversy and precipitated a public rebuke by African leaders. Behind the scenes, however, scholars have highlighted how the ICC's Offi ce of the Prosecutor is building relationships with national decision-makers and encouraging them to develop trial and accountability mechanisms that satisfy the complementary standard. 59 Th ese eff orts will determine the extent to which the ICC is eff ective in anchoring its vision of international criminal justice in national legal orders.
Future research on embeddedness eff ectiveness should address several understudied issues. First, a few ICs with human rights jurisdiction, including the Court of Justice of the ECOWAS Court of Justice (ECOWAS CJ) and the East African Court of Justice (EACJ), do not require exhaustion of local remedies. African NGOs have praised the omission of exhaustion as enabling litigants to bypass overburdened and unresponsive domestic courts and fi le complaints directly with these ICs. But direct international review of complaints can create frictions with national judges, making it harder to forge the judicial partnerships on which eff ective embeddedness oft en depends. 60 A second issue concerns ICs that must occasionally act as fi rst-instance courts. Th e ECtHR, for example, has assumed this function when reviewing "hot spots" of civil unrest in Turkey and Chechnya. 61 A key challenge, however, is how a tribunal steps back from this front-line position when domestic conditions improve. A third underexplored topic concerns courts that exercise jurisdiction over countries in which governments are unstable, the rule of law is weak, or judges are only partially independent. An IC's ability to embed its rulings in such countries may require cultivating the support of sub-state institutions that "forge a relationship with a supranational tribunal as an ally in a domestic political battle against corruption or oppression. " 62 
Effectiveness in Developing International Law
Th e previous three types of eff ectiveness evaluate the extent to which IC rulings alter the behavior of litigants, states, and government actors. A fourth dimension of eff ectiveness analyzes the norm-generating functions of ICs. Th e literature on this topic is vast and includes studies of treaty interpretation, 63 judicial lawmaking, 64 judicial activism, 65 transjudicial communication, 66 and the fragmentation of international law. 67 Th is section reviews a subset of this literature-studies of how the disaggregated nature of the international legal system and the quality of a tribunal's reasoning infl uence whether ICs are eff ective in developing international law.
Most ICs are specialized bodies that interpret and apply only the treaty that establishes them, or a family of closely related treaties within a single legal regime. 68 Th e ECtHR, for example, can review complaints alleging violations of the European Convention on Human Rights and its Protocols-not other human rights agreements. An IC's norm-development eff ectiveness is thus most oft en assessed by reference to how its judges interpret and apply the particular treaty or area of international law that falls within its purview.
Within these specialized domains, courts oft en develop a reputation for particular doctrinal innovations. Th e IACtHR, for example, is a pioneer in fashioning creative and far-reaching remedies for human rights abuses. 69 Th e ECtHR is famous for using the margin of appreciation doctrine to temper global human rights standards to local particularities. 70 Th e WTO jurists are well known for consulting dictionaries to deduce the ordinary meaning of trade treaties. 71 Th e ATJ has made its mark by balancing intellectual property rights against consumer protection and public health goals. 72 Even the ICJ-a court of general jurisdiction-has developed a niche market in territorial and maritime boundary disputes. 73 Th e more closely that an IC is associated with regime-specifi c innovations, the greater the likelihood that observers will evaluate its norm-development eff ectiveness by reference to its performance in that specialized area, such as whether its decisions clarify ambiguities, fi ll lacunae, and promote the underlying objectives of the legal obligations that the court supervises.
As the number of IC rulings has increased, however, scholars have begun to focus on "the systematic fashion in which some [ICs] are developing a body of law of general relevance. " 74 Th e Appellate Body's statement that WTO agreements are "not to be read in clinical isolation from public international law" 75 is oft en cited as evidence of this trend. Th e extent to which ICs are eff ective in elucidating broader legal principles may depend on whether their decisions are emulated elsewhere. For example, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR-the oldest and most active IC-has long inspired other human rights tribunals, a phenomenon documented in case studies of transjudicial dialogue and more systematic analysis of citations to IC precedents. 76 More recently, the decisions of newer human rights courts have infl uenced ECtHR judges searching for doctrinal responses to systemic human rights abuses that plague some corners of Europe. 77 A related issue concerns cases that straddle the border between legal domains. Such suits arise less frequently than cases within the heartland of an IC's jurisdiction. But how judges resolve these "boundary disputes" oft en receives disproportionate attention in assessments of a court's eff ectiveness in developing international law. Examples include the Appellate Body's accommodation of multilateral eff orts to protect the environment and public health when adjudicating free trade disputes, 78 and the IACtHR's interpretation of human rights in light of international humanitarian law. 79 Th e heightened salience of these cases is a consequence of the uneven distribution of ICs across the international legal system. Because ICs do not exist in some areas of international law (such as the environment and arms control), litigants oft en ask courts in other regimes (human rights and trade, for example) to apply legal rules beyond their primary areas of competence.
A more fi ne-grained dimension of norm-development eff ectiveness concerns the quality of an IC's legal reasoning. Studies of supranational adjudication in Europe, for example, attribute the success of the ECJ and ECtHR to the courts' adept use of "the language of reasoned interpretation, logical deduction, systemic and temporal coherence. " 80 Th ese attributes created a "compliance pull" 81 for judicial rulings that infl uenced all actors within the EC and the European Convention legal systems, in particular national judges. 82 Scholarly assessments of legal reasoning generally focus on several issues. Th e fi rst relates to the structure of IC opinions and the extent to which they faithfully recount the litigants' arguments before the court provides its own analysis. Such an approach off ers tangible proof that the judges have at least understood the parties' claims. Litigants who believe that their arguments have been heard are more likely to participate in a future case. 83 A second issue concerns adherence to precedent. ICs are not bound by their own prior judgments. Yet most recognize that treating previous rulings as authoritative furthers the "interests of legal certainty, foreseeability and equality before the law, " 84 and encourages doctrinal consistency over time. 85 A third metric for evaluating legal reasoning emphasizes decisions that overturn or revise existing jurisprudence. International judges acknowledge that such rulings require a heavy burden of justifi cation. 86 Th e weighty reasons they cite oft en involve the application of evolutive methods of treaty interpretation to ensure that existing case law does not become outmoded. 87 Future scholarship on IC eff ectiveness in developing international law will likely proceed along a number of tracks. As the number of international judicial rulings continues to increase, legal scholars and practicing lawyers will continue to analyze the jurisprudence of individual ICs. Th ese court-specifi c studies provide indispensable guides to case law that is becoming too voluminous for non-specialists to digest without assistance. Th e studies also expose the doctrinal innovations of lesser-known sub-regional or specialized ICs to a wider audience of practitioners, scholars, and civil society advocates, who can then assess whether a particular court is eff ective in developing the legal norms within its purview. 88 Th e growing scrutiny of IC jurisprudence may generate feedback loops as judges review and potentially reassess the persuasiveness of their legal reasoning in light of these external evaluations.
Th e collective contributions of ICs to developing legal norms will be aided by the growing scholarly interest in the comparative dimensions of international adjudication. 89 Th e Oxford University Press book series on ICs includes several volumes that contrast the doctrines and practices of multiple tribunals. Specialized journals, such as the Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals and the Journal of International Dispute Settlement , have published many similar studies. Several universities have also established interdisciplinary centers devoted to ICs. 90 Th e output of these scholarly venues will provide a rich body of evidence to evaluate the ways in which ICs, both individually and collectively, are eff ective in developing international law.
Conclusion
Th is chapter has reviewed four dimensions of IC eff ectiveness. Th ese dimensions are conceptually distinct. For example, an IC judgment may be ignored by the respondent state but trigger policy reforms in other nations subject to the tribunal's jurisdiction.
Such a ruling would have low case-specifi c eff ectiveness but high erga omnes eff ectiveness. Th ere is, however, a degree of overlap between the four dimensions at the margins, such as where an IC persuades national judges to remedy international law violations "at home" (increasing embeddedness eff ectiveness) and also infl uences the jurisprudence of other ICs (enhancing norm-development eff ectiveness). Careful attention to the multiple functions that international judges perform will help determine whether a court is eff ective in one or more of the four categories.
Future research might also consider the relationships among diff erent types of eff ectiveness. ICs vary in their ability to infl uence state behavior, anchor their judgments in domestic law, and develop international norms. Scholars might investigate the causes of these variations and their consequences for issues such as the legitimacy of international institutions. A related line of inquiry would consider when diff erent effi cacy objectives are mutually reinforcing or in tension with each other. For example, an IC that is eff ectively embedded in national legal orders might generate fewer international complaints and, as a result, have fewer opportunities to articulate erga omnes norms applicable to all states. Similarly, a court that encourages litigants to settle their disputes may receive high marks for case-specifi c eff ectiveness but be less eff ective in developing international law.
Research Questions
